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REASONABLE SUSPICION AUTHORIZES DETENTION OF OCCUPANTS OF
VALIDLY SEARCHED PREMISES
Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981)
In Michigan v. Summers' the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized a new exception to the fourth amendment2 probable cause re-
quirement by holding that the detention of an occupant on the premises
during the execution of a valid search is constitutionally permissible if
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Respondent, who was charged with the possession of heroin3 found
on his person at the time of arrest,4 moved to suppress the heroin as the
1. 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
2. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3. Respondent was charged with a violation of the Controlled Substances Act of 1971,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 335.341(4)(a) (1972).
4. After discovering that respondent was the owner of the premises and finding narcotics in
the basement, police arrested respondent and subsequently searched him. The Supreme Court
held that respondent's arrest was based on probable cause. 101 S. Ct. at 2594. It is well estab-
lished that a police officer may fully search the accused in the course of a lawful custodial arrest.
See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (the right to search flows automatically
from a lawful custodial arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (same); Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (search and seizure incident to lawful arrest referred to
as "a practice of ancient origin" and "an integral part" of police procedure); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (the right to "contemporaneously" search a person lawfully arrested
"not to be doubted").
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that it was reasonable for a police
officer to search an individual after arresting him "in order to remove any weapons that the latter
might seek to use in order to resist or effect his escape," id at 763, and further, to search for and
seize any evidence that might easily be secreted or destroyed. The Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that it is immaterial whether the officer has reason to suspect that the subject is armed or
whether the subject is arrested for an offense for which no fruits would exist. See, e.g., Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (respondent arrested for failing to have his driver's license in his
possession while driving); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (respondent arrested for
operating a motor vehicle after his license was revoked).
Moreover, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has been extended beyond the person of the
accused to include the area in his immediate possession and control See, e.g., Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of petitioner's parlor in which arrest was effectuated upheld); Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (search of petitioner's hotel room upheld); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of a three-room apartment upheld). See generally 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.3 (1978).
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product of an illegal search and seizure. 5 He alleged that the law en-
forcement officers detained him without probable cause while they exe-
cuted a valid warrant to search his residence for narcotics.6 The trial
court granted the motion,7 and both the Michigan Court of Appeals 8
and the Michigan Supreme Court9 affirmed. On certiorari,' 0 the
United States Supreme Court reversed and held: A warrant to search
particular premises for contraband implicitly carries with it the limited
authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search
is conducted.I I
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures"12 and13 prohibits
5. See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
6. When police officers arrived at respondent's residence, they confronted respondent on his
way out the front door. The officers forced respondent to re-enter his home and remain there for
the duration of the search. The Court viewed this fact as having no constitutional significance.
101 S. Ct. at 2595.
7. People v. Summers, 68 Mich. App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689 (1976).
8. Id
9. People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979). The Michigan Supreme
Court held that seizure of defendant, unsupported by probable cause, violated the fourth
amendment.
10. Michigan v. Summers, 449 U.S. 898 (1980) (mem.).
11. 101 S. Ct. at 2595.
12. The inclusion of this provision in the Bill of Rights was unquestionably a reaction against
both the hated "writs of assistance" in colonial America and the use of the "general warrant" for
searches and arrest in common-law England. The writs of assistance gave customs officers the
right to conduct discretionary searches to seize goods, wares, and merchandise believed to be
smuggled, absent any factual showing based on sworn testimony. The general warrant, which did
not have to describe the person or thing to be seized or the place to be searched, was declared
illegal in Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). For a comprehensive discussion
see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
13. There is argument as to whether the conjunction "and" used in the fourth amendment
was intended to separate the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures from that set-
ting forth the conditions under which warrants may issue. The initial draft of the amendment,
submitted by James Madison, read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not par-
ticularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1789). The version that was ultimately passed by
Congress was similar to Madison's draft, incorporating the unreasonable searches and seizures
section and the warrant section into a single, unified clause. However, the chairman of the com-
mittee to arrange the passed amendments drafted his own version, containing two seemingly sepa-
rate and distinct clauses, which was submitted unnoticed to the Senate. The Senate agreed to that
version, and it subsequently was immortalized in the Bill of Rights. For a complete account, see J.
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the issuance of arrest and search warrants1 4 except upon a showing of
"probable cause."' 15  Enforced through the use of the exclusionary
rule,' 6 the fourth amendment applies to all seizures of the person,1 7
including those involving only brief detentions'" that do not amount to
LANDYNSKI, SEARCHES & SEIZURES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, supra note 12,
at 102-03.
A number of Justices have expressed the opinion, based on the legislative history of the fourth
amendment, that the warrant clause is paramount and that therefore all searches or seizures must
be based upon probable cause. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-62 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id at 195, 196 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. The warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate who is capable of
determining whether probable cause exists for an arrest or search. See Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963).
Although the Court has consistently held that the fourth amendment applies to the issuance of
both search and arrest warrants, an arrest supported by probable cause has never been held un-
constitutional "solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 112 (1975). It is generally recognized that a rigid rule requiring review by a magistrate prior
to all arrests would be extremely detrimental to effective law enforcement. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
15. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Supreme Court explained that
"[p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being comitted." Id at
175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 4, §§ 3.1-.7.
16. The exclusionary rule was first introduced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
In Weeks the Supreme Court held that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures could not be used in a federal court against
the person whose rights had been violated. The rule was extended to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963), which held
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id at 655.
For a comprehensive discussion of the exclusionary rule, see Geller, Enforcing the Fourth
Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 621; Kaplan, he
Limits ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Comment, Admissibility of filegally
Obtained Evidence--4he Federal Exclusionary Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38 U. DET. L.J. 635
(1961). See generally I W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, §§ 1.I-.11.
17. Although the fourth amendment never explicitly uses the term "arrest," it not only en-
sures "the right ofpeople to be secure in their persons . . . " but it also stipulates that warrants
must particularly describe the 'ersons or things to be seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis
added).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (stops of vehicles at per-
manent checkpoints for brief questioning of occupants); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1396 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1393
full-scale arrests. 19
Historically, the Supreme Court adopted the view that probable
cause was a prerequisite to all seizures governed by the fourth amend-
ment, irrespective of the extent of intrusion. In 1968, however, the
Court for the first time recognized an exception to this general rule in
Terry v. Ohio .0 In Terry, the Court found that when the circumstances
of a particular case led a police officer reasonably to suspect21 that
"criminal activity was afoot" and that the subject with whom he was
dealing was "armed and presently dangerous, ' 22 the police officer
could detain him and subject him to a limited search for weapons23
even absent jrobable cause for arrest.24 The Court stated that although
87 (1975) (stops of vehicles by officers on roving patrol for brief questioning of occupants); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (momentary street detention for brief questioning and limited search).
19. The 1979 edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines an "arrest" as "depriv[ing] a person
of his liberty by legal authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme
Court traditionally has accepted this definition. For example, in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959), the majority held that federal agents detaining an automobile whose occupants had
engaged in suspicious activity lacked probable cause to arrest, and then stated that "[w]hen the
officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest .. .was
complete." Id at 103.
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry decision was preceded by heated debate. Those in support
of the decision emphasized the law enforcement officer's need for immediate action in potentially
life threatening situations. See, e.g., Brief of Attorney General of the State of New York as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Appellees, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 552-60 (1975). On the other
hand, Terry opponents argued that the right to stop and frisk encouraged arbitrary and oppressive
police behavior. See, e.g., Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 493-94 (1975).
21. The phrase "reasonable suspicion," referring to that quantum of evidence necessary to
carry out a stop and frisk, is commonly associated with Terry. The phrase was not first expressly
used, however, until Justice Harlan wrote in his concurring opinion in Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968), that "[u]nder the decision in Terry a right to stop may indeed be premised on
reasonable suspicion and does not require probable cause . . . ." Id. at 71 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
23. The Court emphasized the restricted nature of a permissible search, stating that an officer
may conduct a "carefully limited search" only of the "outer clothing" of a suspect in an attempt to
disclose weapons. Id at 30.
24. Id at 27. The Court concluded that because such a search is reasonable under the fourth
amendment, "any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken." Id at 31.
Prior to Terry, state and lower federal courts and some state legislatures had established fairly
well the right of a policeman to stop an individual for interrogation upon less than probable cause.
The courts placed differing limitations on the constitutionality of such conduct depending on the
circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Keiningham v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
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a momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for weap-
ons constituted a fourth amendment seizure,26 the detention was sub-
stantially less intrusive than a traditional arrest.27 The Court held that
the reasonableness 28 of a Terry-type detention should be determined by
balancing the invasion of a citizen's personal security29 against the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing crime and in protecting police of-
ficers30 rather than by the traditional, and more rigid, probable cause
(circumstances warranted officer in making some inquiry about the ownership of a briefcase that
was being abandoned in the officer's presence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 948 (1963); United States v.
Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (not every momentary detention of a suspicious indi-
vidual is a seizure under the fourth amendment), rev'don other grounds sub nor. United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); People v. Jones, 176 Cal. App. 2d 265, 1 Cal. Rptr. 210
(1959) (police officers under certain circumstances have the right to make inquiry of persons on
the public streets at night).
The Uniform Arrest Act of 1942 symbolizes the first attempt at formulation of rules dealing
with the questioning and detaining of suspects. INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CRIME, THE HAND-
BOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (1942). By the late 1950s, three states had enacted
stop and frisk legislation based on the Uniform Arrest Act's provisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 1901-1910 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:1-:25 (1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-7-1 to -
12 (1969 & Supp. 1980).
In 1964, New York enacted § 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, patterned
largely after the Uniform Arrest Act and employing the reasonable suspicion standard as a means
of evaluating both the stop and the frisk stages of police investigation. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
Finally, in 1966, the American Law Institute incorporated into its Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure a section dealing with the constitutional validity of a stop and frisk without prob-
able cause to arrest. ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(5) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966). See ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 (1975).
25. During the early 1960s, this common police practice came to be referred to euphemisti-
cally as "stop and frisk" and was a popular subject of many commentators. See Abrams, Consitu-
tional Limitations on Detentionfor Investigation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 1093 (1967); LaFave, Detention
for Investigation by the Police: AnAnaisris of Current Practice, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331; Schwartz,
Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433 (1967). The Supreme Court, however, did not con-
front the issue until Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
26. The Supreme Court determined that, "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16.
27. Id at 26-27.
28. The Court stated that the "central inquiry" under the fourth amendment is "the reason-
ableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion." Id at 19.
29. The Court argued that the police officer must be able to defend his conduct with "specific
and articulable facts" that would reasonably have warranted the intrusion on the individual's
privacy. Id at 21.
30. The Court cited various statistics revealing the high risks of armed violence confronting
police officers in the line of duty. Id at 24 n.21. The majority asserted that the governmental
interest in investigating crime was secondary to the more immediate concern of the police in
taking precautionary measures to insure that the subject under suspicion "is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Id at 23.
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standard.31
Initially, the Supreme Court applied the Terry standard solely to
cases involving traditional stop and frisk circumstances. 32  The Court
adopted a piecemeal approach, evaluating the fourth amendment issue
according to the particular circumstances of each case.33 In these early
cases, the Court continued to utilize the balancing approach introduced
in Terry, weighing the necessity to seize and search against the degree
of state intrusion into individual privacy.34 Although these cases
served to clarify and refine the Terry doctrine, the Court consistently
maintained the narrowness of the Terry holding35 by recognizing the
constitutional propriety of seizures based upon less than probable cause
only in those cases in which both reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity and a serious threat to the officer's safety existed.36
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 37 however, the Supreme Court extended
Terry's limited scope38 by holding that a routine policy of ordering out
of their vehicles all drivers stopped for traffic violations was constitu-
tionally permissible despite the absence of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and a belief that the subject was armed and danger-
ous.39 In Mimms, reasonable suspicion arose only after defendant, at
31. Id at 20-27. The concept of determining the reasonableness of an intrusion by balancing
the governmental interest against the invasion of the individual's privacy was first used in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 37 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
32. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). This was also the approach taken by the
lower federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970); Carpen-
ter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969).
33. E.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In this case the officer's reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity was derived from an informant's tip that the subject was carrying narcot-
ics and a gun. The officer approached the automobile in which the subject was seated and
immediately seized the weapon. The Adams Court held that under the circumstances, including
the subject's initial refusal to get out of the car, the officer's conduct constituted "a limited intru-
sion designed to insure his safety" and was therefore reasonable. Id at 148. It was irrelevant that
the officer's reasonable suspicion was based on an informant's tip rather than personal observa-
tion, as long as the informant displayed some "indicia of reliability." Id at 147.
34. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
35. The Terry Court held specifically that a police officer can conduct a limited search for
weapons only when he reasonably believes that his safety is threatened. 392 U.S. at 27. More-
over, in a footnote, the Court emphasized that its decision did not attempt to delineate the outer
limits of the new reasonable suspicion standard: "[W]e. . . decide nothing today concerning the
constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of
'detention' and/or interrogation." Id at 19 n.16.
36. See text accompanying note 22 supra. See generaly 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, § 9.2.
37. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. 434 U.S. at 111-12. Two years later, however, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the
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the request of a police officer, had stepped out of his automobile. The
officer then observed a large bulge under defendant's jacket.4° The
loaded revolver that was subsequently discovered was suppressed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,41 but the United States Supreme
Court reversed.42 In reaching its decision, the Mimms Court balanced
the interests in police safety43 against the intrusion into the driver's per-
sonal liberty," concluding that once the vehicle had been lawfully de-
tained, the additional intrusion was "de minimus."'45
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce46 the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time an exception to the probable cause requirement in a
situation not involving limited weapons search.47 The Court concluded
that the fourth amendment permitted a roving border patrol to detain
briefly a vehicle near the Mexican border on the reasonable suspicion
that the automobile was carrying illegal aliens.48  The Court again in-
voked the Terry balancing test,49 this time weighing the public interest
in preventing illegal entry into the United States5" against the severity
of the interference with individual liberty.5 ' Similarly, in United States
Court held a Texas law providing that police officers could stop citizens and request identification
violative of the fourth amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion requirement.
40. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977). Police officers had initially stopped
respondent upon observing that he was driving a vehicle with an expired license plate. Id
41. Commonwealth v. Minims, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157, rev'dsub non. Pennsylvania v.
Minims, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Terry in finding that the
police officer's conduct constituted an impermissible seizure under the fourth amendment because
the order was issued as a matter of policy, rather than on the basis of "specific and articulable
facts" supporting a reasonable suspicion that the driver posed a threat to the officer's safety. Id. at
552-53, 370 A.2d at 1160-61. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
42. 434 U.S. at 107.
43. Id at 110. The Court noted that according to one study nearly 30% of all police shoot-
ings took place "when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile." Id
44. Id at I11.
45. Id The Court reasoned that "[t]he police have already lawfully decided that the driver
shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the
driver's seat of his car or standing alongside it." Id
46, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
47. See notes 32-45 supra and accompanying text.
48. 422 U.S. at 880. The Court held, however, that the fourth amendment prohibited roving
patrol stops based merely on the apparent Mexican ancestry of a vehicle's occupants, because that
alone was not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id at 886.
49. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
50. The Court noted that the number of aliens residing illegally in the United States ranged
from approximately one million to ten or twelve million and deemed their presence to be a "sig-
nificant economic and social problem." 422 U.S. at 878.
51. Id at 880. The Court observed that a border stop "'usually consumes no more than a
minute " and involves only a few brief questions. Id
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v. Martinez-Fuere,5" the Court used the Terry reasoning to hold that
police could stop vehicles at permanent checkpoints and briefly ques-
tion the occupants even in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that
those vehicles contained illegal aliens. 3
In other cases, the Supreme Court has balanced the Terry scales in
favor of the individual. In Delaware v. Prouse,"4 for example, the
Court held that a state policy of arbitrarily detaining automobiles in
order to check license and registration information, without any reason
to suspect illegal activity, violated the fourth amendment.5 The Court
declared that this type of intrusion could not be justified by the state's
interest in promoting highway safety. 6 In Davis v. Mississippi,57 the
Court held that in the absence of probable cause for arrest, the fourth
amendment would not permit the detention of suspects at police head-
quarters for fingerprinting and interrogation.58
52. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
53. Id at 559. The Court recognized that the governmental interest in performing routine
checkpoint stops is immense, whereas the consequent intrusion on the individual is limited. Id at
557.
The Court, however, has never permitted an intrusion beyond questioning of occupants of vehi-
cles at border stops absent probable cause. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (war-
rantless vehicle searches by border patrol officers at fixed checkpoints absent consent or probable
cause held violative of fourth amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (same). See generally 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, § 10.5.
54. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
55. Id at 663. The Court cited United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), in finding that the stop of an automobile
and the detention of its occupants constitutes a fourth amendment seizure. 440 U.S. 653. The
Court declared that such a detention to check license and registration information would be per-
missible, however, if based on "articulable grounds" and a "reasonable suspicion" that the driver
did not have a license or that the automobile was unregistered. Id. at 656.
56. 440 U.S. at 658-59. The Court agreed with the petitioner that the states have a vital
interest in highway safety, but concluded that a system of random spot checks would have only an
incremental contribution toward this interest. Id. at 659.
57. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
58. Id at 726-27. The Court held that the fingerprints obtained pursuant to this detention
were inadmissible as fruits of an unlawful seizure. Id at 723. The Court indicted in dictum,
however, that a station house detention for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints might,
"under narrowly defined circumstances," be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment,
even in the absence of probable cause. Id at 727.
Other types of investigative detentions not supported by probable cause have withstood scrutiny
under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand jury
subpoenas summoning 20 persons to the United States Attorney's Office, where they were re-
quested to make voice recordings, upheld on the basis that a grand jury subpoena is not a fourth
amendment seizure); Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. 1971) (court-ordered line-up without
probable cause for arrest held permissible in a rape investigation). But see Beightol v. Kunowski,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/12
Number 4] DETENTION OF OCCUPANTS 1401
In Dunaway v. New York59 the Supreme Court again refused to ex-
tend the Terry doctrine to the context of custodial interrogations.60 In
Dunaway, police officers had reasonable suspicion, not amounting to
probable cause, to believe that the petitioner was connected with an
attempted robbery and homicide.61 The petitioner was taken into cus-
tody62 and interrogated, whereupon he made statements and drew
sketches that were used against him at his trial.63 The state appellate
court upheld the admissibility of the evidence,' but the Supreme Court
reversed, arguing that the intrusion involved in Dunaway was largely
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest 65 and that any exception cre-
ated to justify such detentions "would threaten to swallow the general
rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on
probable cause."66
486 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1973) (seizure of subject free on bail at preliminary hearing to obtain finger-
prints and photograph held unconstitutional).
59. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
60. Id See note 58 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102
(1969) (per curiam) (Court chose not to rule on propriety of custodial detention without probable
cause for arrest and remanded case for further proceedings on the issue). But see United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), in which a plurality of the Court held that the detention in an
airport investigative office and subsequent search of a woman did not violate the fourth amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delivering the opinion for the Court,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that no fourth amendment seizure had
occurred because the record indicated that the respondent had no reason to believe that she was
not free to leave. Id at 555. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
dissented from this portion of the Court's opinion. Justice Powell assumed that the detention did
constitute a seizure and proceeded to argue that this seizure could be upheld as reasonable by
weighing the great public interest in prevention of drug trafficking against the minimal intrusion
on the individual. Id at 565. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
filed a dissenting opinion, contending that the respondent's detention was of the same class as that
in Dunaway, and as such, required probable cause to support it. Id at 574-76. See generally
Kirschner, The Probable Cause Requirement in CustodialDetentions, 21 N.H.B.J. 370 (1980); Com-
ment, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 733 (1980). See also Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590 (1975) (Court held
inadmissible inculpatory statements made during police station interrogation subsequent to arrest
based on less than probable cause).
61. 442 U.S. at 203.
62. Id Although the petitioner was not informed that he was under arrest at the time he was
taken into custody, he would have been physically restrained had he attempted to leave. Id.
63. Id
64. Id at 206. The appellate court found that despite the absence of probable cause, the
detention was permissible because it was based on reasonable suspicion and because the subject
was interrogated for only a "brief period of time." Id
65. Id at 212. The Court argued that the petitioner's seizure was not even "roughly analo-
gous" to the limited intrusion involved in Terry. Id at 213.
66. Id
Often intertwined with the fourth amendment issue in the custodial detention cases is the ques-
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In Michigan v. Summers67 the Court determined that the weight of
the competing interests was on the side of the state when it applied the
Terry balancing test to the special context of detentions incident to the
execution of valid search warrants." Writing for the majority,69 Justice
tion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For example, in Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), an unlawfully detained suspect who had been advised of his fifth
amendment privilege as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), subsequently made
several incriminating statements that eventually were used to convict him of murder. The
Supreme Court held that use of the Miranda warnings, although sufficient to protect an individ-
ual's fifth amendment interests, could not extend to safeguard his fourth amendment rights as
well. Thus, the suspect's statements, as products of an illegal seizure, were improperly admitted at
trial. In Dunaway, the Court was confronted with a similar factual situation. 442 U.S. at 203. In
this case, however, a full confession was extracted from petitioner, who had been issued his Mi-
randa warnings and had waived counsel. Id After resolving the fourth amendment issue, the
Court turned to the fifth amendment question and held that to allow the prosecution to use peti-
tioner's confession would permit "law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with
impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the 'procedural safeguards' of
the fifth." Id at 219. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Gregory v. United
States, 231 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956). See generally 3 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 4, § 11.4. For a comprehensive discussion, see Kamisar, Illegal Searches and Seizures
and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78.
67. 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
68. Id at 2591-93. In the similar case of Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the
Supreme Court evaded the question of whether petitioner and his companions were illegally de-
tained at the residence of one of the companions while two of six officers departed for about 45
minutes to obtain a search warrant. At his trial for trafficking in and possession of narcotics,
Rawlings unsuccessfully sought to exclude an inculpatory statement he had made at the time of
the search. On certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the admission of this statement. Assuming
for the sake of argument that the detention did violate the fourth amendment, the Court found
that the petitioner's statement was not a result of this unlawful detention. The Court reasoned
that not only was petitioner's statement voluntary, but he had received his Miranda warnings
immediately before making it, the atmosphere remained congenial throughout the duration of the
detention, and finally, the officer's behavior did not amount to "flagrant misconduct." Id at 106-
10.
State and lower federal courts have reached the issue of whether a police officer may detain a
person on the premises pending the execution of a valid search warrant based upon reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity on numerous occasions. The courts have arrived at differing conclu-
sions according to the practices and procedures followed in the particular jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976) (police officers entering premises with valid
search warrant for narcotics not justified in detaining defendant against his will in view of the fact
that detention was unnecessarily long); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973)
(proposition that persons present on premises to be searched pursuant to valid warrant may not be
detained is "clearly frivolous"); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960) (court
suggested in dictum that officer executing a search warrant could detain persons on premises to
insure that the detainees would not depart with evidence); State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1971) (police officers with reasonable suspicion justified in detaining defendant for two hours
under uniform arrest law while proper search was conducted); State v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 567, 577
P.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiff, who was getting ready to leave premises in car when officers
arrived, was lawfully detained while premises were searched pursuant to warrant).
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Stevens found that the detention did not violate respondent's fourth
amendment right "to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his
person."7 Conceding that respondent's detention constituted a fourth
amendment "seizure"71 unsupported by probable cause,72 the Court
concluded that this seizure was nevertheless reasonable. 73 The Court
cited Terry and its progeny7 4 for the proposition that some detentions,
although subject to the fourth amendment, are sufficiently less intrusive
than traditional arrests and are supported by such substantial law en-
forcement interests as to be valid if based upon reasonable suspicion
rather than upon probable cause.75 The majority distinguished Duna-
way76 as involving a detention of much greater severity.77
In justifying detentions based upon reasonable suspicion during
proper searches, the Court balanced the government intrusion 78 against
69. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2589-90. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a search warrant
authorizes police to search the occupants of a premises, because the eventual search of respondent
was incident to his arrest. Id at 2590. Therefore, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), relied on
by the respondent, was not applicable. Ybarra dealt solely with the issue of whether police execut-
ing a search warrant in a public tavern could search all of the customers present. Without consid-
ering the validity of the detention of the petitioner, the Court held that a warrant authorizing
search of a premises does not automatically authorize a search of all persons thereon and, further,
that the search of petitioner was invalid for lack of probable cause. Id at 90-96.
For additional cases dealing with the issue of whether a search warrant for premises permits a
search of persons on those premises, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (Ist Cir. 1973); United States
v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1964); Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
863 (1957). See generaly 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 4.9.
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2590 & n.5. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2590. The Court noted that its decision was based on an assumption of the
existence of probable cause to arrest. Id at 2590 & n.3.
73. Id at 2595.
74. Id at 2591-92. The Court relied heavily on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2592. The Court stated that police must have an "articulable basis for sus-
pecting criminal activity." Id
76. Id at 2591-92. The Michigan Supreme Court relied on Dunaway in arguing that any
seizure consisting of more than a momentary detention must be supported by consent or probable
cause. People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 444-46, 286 N.W.2d 226, 229 (1979), rev'd sub nom.
Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
78. Id at 2593.
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the public interest in effective law enforcement.7 9 The Court reasoned
that because a neutral and detached magistrate, in issuing a valid
search warrant, had already approved a substantial invasion of the re-
spondent's privacy, the added intrusion resulting from his detainment
was inconsequential.80 Moreover, the detention of the respondent at
his own residence involved neither the indignity associated with an on-
the-street detention nor the inconvenience of a trip to the police sta-
tion.8 1 The Court further observed that the public interest in minimiz-
ing the risk of harm to officers, 82 preventing the escape of criminal
suspects, 83 and facilitating the orderly completion of searches84 clearly
outweighed the minimal intrusion imposed upon the person detained.85
In conclusion, the majority noted that the requisite element of rea-
sonable suspicion" could be implied from the existence of a search
warrant, because a judicial officer had previously found probable cause
to believe that the law was being violated on the premises to be
searched.87
Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall,8 8 argued that the Court should not uphold a detention based on
less than probable cause unless the government could justify the deten-
tion with a purpose beyond the ordinary police interest in effective
criminal investigation. 9 The dissent argued that the petitioner in Sum-
79. Id at 2593-94.
80. Id at 2593. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), in which the Court
held that once the vehicle has been stopped, the added intrusion is de minimus. See note 45 supra
and accompanying text.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2593.
82. Id at 2594. Justice Stevens noted that a search pursuant to a warrant is the type of
endeavor that frequently gives rise to "sudden violence" or "frantic efforts to conceal or destroy
evidence." Id at 2594. See, e.g., People v. Nefzger, 173 Colo. 199, 476 P.2d 995 (1970).
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2594.
84. Id In its brief, petitioner noted that particularly where the nature of the evidence is such
that it can readily be hidden or destroyed, there is a strong public policy interest in not permitting
occupants on the premises "to roam about at will." Brief for Petitioner at 13, Michigan v. Sum-
mers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
85. 101 S. Ct. at 2594. In balancing the public and private interests involved, the Court did
not consider the possibility of the suspect departing from the premises with the sought-after evi-
dence. Emphasis on such an issue would have signified an even greater departure from the rulings
in Terry and Sibron.
86. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 2594.
88. Id at 2595.
89. Id at 2596. The dissent recognized only two classes of cases in which seizures do not
have to be supported by probable cause: stop and frisk cases and border patrol cases. Id In both
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mers failed to present such an extraordinary interest.90 In addition, the
dissent distinguished the Terry and Brignoni-Ponce lines of cases as in-
volving only momentary detentions, 91 whereas the type of seizure up-
held in Summers potentially could last for several hours.92 The dissent
concluded that the Summers facts provided no occasion for a departure
from the traditional standard of probable cause usually applied in
fourth amendment cases.9 3
Although the Court's opinion in Terry v. Ohio initially appeared con-
servative and hesitant,94 subsequent decisions invoking the Terry pre-
cedent have been increasingly broad and decisive. 95 It has become
clear that in sanctioning a single exception to the probable cause re-
quirement, the Terry decision precipitated a definite shift from tradi-
tional fourth amendment standards.96 The holding in Michigan v.
Summers indicates that the Supreme Court has not yet completed its
expansion of Terry.
The detention validated in Summers constituted a permissible
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The officers had
reasonable suspicion that the respondent was engaging in criminal ac-
tivity.97 The detention presumably was of limited duration98 and did
not entail transporting the respondent to a different location.99 In addi-
tion, any interrogation was limited to a few brief questions to ascertain
general information.l"o Moreover, the detention eliminated the chance
that the defendant might secrete or destroy evidence, go into hiding, or
types of cases, the government has demonstrated prevailing concerns beyond the normal interests
in law enforcement. Id at 2597.
90. Id The dissent asserted that the law enforcement objectives represented by the majority
in the case at bar, in contrast to those justified in Terry and Brignoni-Ponce, represented "nothing
more than the ordinary police interest in discovering evidence of crime and apprehending wrong-
doers." Id
91. Id at 2598.
92. Id
93. Id at 2599. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 37-38, 46-48, 52-53 & 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
97. The officers had secured a warrant founded upon probable cause that criminal activity
was taking place at the residence of the respondent. 101 S. Ct. at 2593. Having ascertained that
the respondent was the owner, the police officers were reasonable in believing that he might be a
participant in the illegal activity. Id at 2589-90.
98. Id at 2593.
99. Id
100. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
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secure a dangerous weapon while the search was being conducted.'
The Court's continued reliance on the balancing test to determine
reasonableness, however, encourages inconsistent results. Law enforce-
ment officers, having no workable set of guidelines, are forced to bal-
ance competing public and individual interests on an ad hoc, case-by-
case basis. The Court in Dunaway v. New York 1°2 correctly pointed out
that officers possess neither the time nor the expertise necessary to per-
form such a task.' 3 More importantly, there exists enormous potential
for abuse or discretion by an overzealous police officer.
The balancing standard also precipitates incongruous decisionmak-
ing by the Supreme Court. An illustration of the incongruity is the
contrast of the decisions in Terry v. Ohio 1° and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 0 5 in which great emphasis was placed on the necessity
of an overwhelming and unique governmental concern, 0 6 with that in
Michigan v. Summers, in which general public interest in efficient law
enforcement was sufficient to sustain the intrusion.0 7 In addition, uni-
form application by state and lower federal courts is entirely
impracticable.
The dissent's concern that the Michigan v. Summers holding may
lead to detentions of unreasonable duration 0 8 is unwarranted. Case
law offers indirect safeguards against this possibility. It is a well-estab-
lished principle that law enforcement officers may remain on the prem-
ises to be searched only for the time reasonably necessary to execute a
warrant. 10 9 The Summers Court specifically held that the occupants of
the premises could be detained only while a "proper search is con-
ducted."" 0 Moreover, some states have enacted legislation patterned
101. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
102. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
103. The Dunaway Court expressed the fear that "the protections intended by the Framers
could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances
presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by
police officers engaged in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' Id at 213
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
104. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
105. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
106. See notes 30 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
107. 101 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
108. Id at 2598.
109. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1970); Levin v. Blair, 17 F.2d 151 (D. Pa.
1927). See also CRIMINAL DMSION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANUAL ON THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 11 (1974).
110. 101 S. Ct. at 2595.
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after Uniform Arrest Act or ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedures provisions. The Uniform Act proposes a limit of two hours for
detentions based on reasonable suspicion but for which probable cause
is lacking;"' the Model Code suggests that such seizures should not
extend beyond twenty minutes.t 2
The Supreme Court should abandon the balancing test in favor of
concise and workable guidelines for determining the constitutional pro-
priety of detentions unsupported by probable cause. Continued appli-
cation of the balancing test will accelerate the erosion of the personal
safeguards established by the fourth amendment.
D.JK.
111. INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CRIME, supra note 24.
112. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (1975).
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